



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

July 13, 2022

Mr. John Fleming
County Attorney
Nacogdoches County
101 West Main Street, Room 230
Nacogdoches, Texas 75961

OR2022-20037

Dear Mr. Fleming:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 958715.

The Nacogdoches County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office") received a request for information pertaining to a specified case.¹ You state the sheriff's office will release some information. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. The sheriff's office also informs us it has notified the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS"), the Angelina County Sheriff's Office ("Angelina County"), and NCIC Inmate Phone Services ("NIPS") of their right to submit comments to this office as to why their information should not be released. *See* Gov't Code §§ 552.304 (interested party may submit written comments regarding availability of requested information), .305(d); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 542 (1990) (statutory predecessor to section 552.305 permits governmental body to rely on interested third party to raise and explain applicability of exception in the Act in certain circumstances). We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

¹ You inform us the requestor was required to make a deposit for payment of anticipated costs for the request under section 552.263 of the Government Code, which the sheriff's office received on April 18, 2022. *See* Gov't Code § 552.263(e) (if governmental body requires deposit or bond for anticipated costs pursuant to section 552.263, request for information is considered to have been received on date that governmental body receives deposit or bond).

An interested third party is allowed ten business days after the date of its receipt of the governmental body's notice under section 552.305(d) to submit its reasons, if any, as to why information relating to that party should be withheld from public disclosure. *See* Gov't Code § 552.305(d)(2)(B). As of the date of this letter, we have not received comments from any third party explaining why the submitted information should not be released. Therefore, we have no basis to conclude any third party has a protected proprietary interest in the submitted information. *See, e.g., id.* § 552.110 (requiring the provision of specific factual evidence demonstrating the applicability of the exception). Accordingly, the sheriff's office may not withhold the submitted information on the basis of any proprietary interest any third party may have in the information.

We understand the sheriff's office to claim Exhibit C-4 is confidential under section 418.181 of the Government Code.² Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." *Id.* § 552.101. This section encompasses information that is made confidential by other statutes. You raise section 552.101 in conjunction with section 418.181 of the Homeland Security Act (the "HSA"). Sections 418.176 through 418.182 were added to chapter 418 of the Government Code as part of the HSA. Section 418.181 provides "[t]hose documents or portions of documents in the possession of a governmental entity are confidential if they identify the technical details of particular vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to an act of terrorism." *Id.* § 418.181. The fact that information may relate to a governmental body's security measures does not make the information *per se* confidential under the HSA. *See* Open Records Decision No. 649 at 3 (1996) (language of confidentiality provision controls scope of its protection). Furthermore, the mere recitation of a statute's key terms is not sufficient to demonstrate the applicability of the claimed provision. As with any exception to disclosure, a claim under section 418.181 must be accompanied by an adequate explanation of how the responsive records fall within the scope of the claimed provision. *See* Gov't Code § 552.301(e)(1)(A) (governmental body must explain how claimed exception to disclosure applies).

You state Exhibit C-4 consists of recordings of the interior of the county jail. You argue, and we agree, the jail is critical infrastructure for the purposes of section 418.181. *See id.* § 421.001 (defining "critical infrastructure" to include "all public or private assets, systems, and functions vital to the security, governance, public health and safety, economy, or morale of the state or the nation"). In addition, you explain Exhibit C-4 depicts the interior layout of the jail and reveals aspects of the jail security system and certain security measures taken at the jail. Thus, you argue release of this information would compromise the security of the jail. Upon review, we find you have established the information at issue identifies the technical details of particular vulnerabilities of the jail to an act of terrorism. Therefore, the sheriff's office must withhold Exhibit C-4 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 418.181 of the Government Code.³

² Although you do not cite to section 418.181 of the Government Code in your brief to this office, we understand you to raise this section based on the substance of your arguments.

³ As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your remaining argument against disclosure of this information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the constitutional right to privacy. Constitutional privacy protects two kinds of interests. *See Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 3-5 (1992), 478 at 4 (1987), 455 at 3-7 (1987). The first is the interest in independence in making certain important decisions related to the “zones of privacy,” pertaining to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education, that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. *See Fadlo v. Coon*, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); ORD 455 at 3-7. The second constitutionally protected privacy interest is in freedom from public disclosure of certain personal matters. *See Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Tex.*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985); ORD 455 at 6-7. This aspect of constitutional privacy balances the individual’s privacy interest against the public’s interest in the information. *See* ORD 455 at 7. Constitutional privacy under section 552.101 is reserved for “the most intimate aspects of human affairs.” *Id.* at 8 (quoting *Ramie*, 765 F.2d at 492).

This office has applied privacy to protect certain information about incarcerated individuals. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 430 (1985), 428 (1985), 185 (1978). Citing *State v. Ellefson*, 224 S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1976) as authority, this office held that those individuals who correspond with inmates possess a “first amendment right . . . to maintain communication with [the inmate] free of the threat of public exposure;” and that this right would be violated by the release of information that identifies those correspondents, because such a release would discourage correspondence. ORD 185. The information at issue in Open Records Decision No. 185 was the identities of individuals who had corresponded with inmates, and our office found that “the public’s right to obtain an inmate’s correspondence list is not sufficient to overcome the first amendment right of the inmate’s correspondents to maintain communication with him free of the threat of public exposure.” ORD 185. Implicit in this holding is the fact that an individual’s association with an inmate may be intimate or embarrassing. In Open Records Decision Nos. 428 and 430, our office determined that inmate visitor and mail logs which identify inmates and those who choose to visit or correspond with inmates are protected by constitutional privacy because people who correspond with inmates have a First Amendment right to do so that would be threatened if their names were released. ORDs 428 and 430. Further, we recognized that inmates had a constitutional right to visit with outsiders and could also be threatened if their names were released. *See also* ORD 185. The rights of those individuals to anonymity was found to outweigh the public’s interest in this information. *Id.*; *see* ORD 430 (list of inmate visitors protected by constitutional privacy of both inmate and visitors). In this instance, Exhibit C-3 consists of phone calls made by inmates. Accordingly, the sheriff’s office must withhold Exhibit C-3 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the constitutional right to privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. The Third Court of Appeals has concluded public citizens’ dates

of birth are protected by common-law privacy pursuant to section 552.101. *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, because “the right of privacy is purely personal,” that right “terminates upon the death of the person whose privacy is invaded.” *Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977))); Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984) (“the right of privacy lapses upon death”), H-917 (1976) (“We are . . . of the opinion that the Texas courts would follow the almost uniform rule of other jurisdictions that the right of privacy lapses upon death.”); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981) (“the right of privacy is personal and lapses upon death”). Thus, information pertaining solely to a deceased individual may not be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. Accordingly, the sheriff’s office must withhold all living individuals’ dates of birth under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.130 of the Government Code provides information relating to a motor vehicle operator’s or driver’s license, motor vehicle title or registration, or personal identification document issued by an agency of this state or another state or country is excepted from public release.⁴ Gov’t Code § 552.130(a). Upon review, we find the sheriff’s office must withhold the vehicle identification number, license plates, drivers license numbers, identification card numbers, and states of issuance under section 552.130 of the Government Code.

In summary, the sheriff’s office must withhold Exhibit C-4 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with section 418.181 of the Government Code. The sheriff’s office must withhold Exhibit C-3 under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the constitutional right to privacy. The sheriff’s office must withhold all living individuals’ dates of birth under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The sheriff’s office must withhold the vehicle identification number, license plates, drivers license numbers, identification card numbers, and states of issuance under section 552.130 of the Government Code. The sheriff’s office must release the remaining information.⁵

⁴ The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. See Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

⁵ We note the remaining information includes social security numbers. Section 552.147(b) of the Government Code authorizes a government body to redact a living person’s social security number from public release without the necessity of requesting a decision from this office under the Act. Gov’t Code § 552.147(b).

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open-government/members-public/what-expect-after-ruling-issued> or call the OAG's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Public Information Act may be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the OAG, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

Kelly McWethy
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

KM/jm

Ref: ID# 958715

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)