



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

January 4, 2022

Ms. M Shelby Percy
Attorney for the City of Duncanville
Nichols, Jackson, Dillard, Hager & Smith
500 North Akard Street, Suite 1800
Dallas, Texas 75201

OR2022-00210

Dear Ms. Percy:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 924306 (Ref. No. TM 125477).

The City of Duncanville (the "city"), which you represent, received a request for information pertaining to the death of a named individual. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.101 of the Government Code. You also state you notified three named individuals of the request for information and of the right to submit arguments to this office as to why the submitted information should not be released. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (interested party may submit comments stating why information should or should not be released). We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." *Id.* § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). The court of appeals has concluded public citizens' dates of birth are protected by common-law privacy pursuant to

section 552.101. *Paxton v. City of Dallas*, No. 03-13-00546-CV, 2015 WL 3394061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 22, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.). However, the right to privacy is a personal right that lapses at death and the common-law right to privacy does not encompass information that relates only to a deceased individual. *Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., Inc.*, 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also *Justice v. Belo Broadcasting Corp.*, 472 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (“action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I (1977))); Attorney General Opinions JM-229 (1984) (“the right of privacy lapses upon death”), H-917 (1976) (“We are . . . of the opinion that the Texas courts would follow the almost uniform rule of other jurisdictions that the right of privacy lapses upon death.”); Open Records Decision No. 272 (1981) (“the right of privacy is personal and lapses upon death”). Accordingly, information pertaining to a deceased individual may not be withheld on common-law privacy grounds.

Thus, the city must withhold all living public citizens’ dates of birth under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. However, upon review, we find the city has failed to demonstrate any of the remaining information pertains to a living individual and is highly intimate or embarrassing and of no legitimate public concern. Therefore, the city may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the constitutional right to privacy. Constitutional privacy protects two kinds of interests. See *Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 3-5 (1992), 478 at 4 (1987), 455 at 3-7. The first is the interest in independence in making certain important decisions related to the “zones of privacy,” pertaining to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education, that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. See *Fadjo v. Coon*, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); ORD 455 at 3-7. The second constitutionally protected privacy interest is in freedom from public disclosure of certain personal matters. See *Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Tex.*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985); ORD 455 at 6-7. This aspect of constitutional privacy balances the individual’s privacy interest against the public’s interest in the information. See ORD 455 at 7. Constitutional privacy under section 552.101 is reserved for “the most intimate aspects of human affairs.” *Id.* at 8 (quoting *Ramie*, 765 F.2d at 492). We note the right to privacy is a personal right that lapses at death and therefore may not be asserted solely on behalf of a deceased individual. See *Moore*, 589 S.W.2d at 491; ORD 272. However, the United States Supreme Court has determined that surviving family members can have a privacy interest in information relating to their deceased relatives. See *Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish*, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).

The remaining information relates to a deceased individual. Therefore, it may not be withheld from disclosure based on the deceased individual’s privacy interests. However, the city states, and provides documentation showing, it notified the deceased individual’s family of the request for information and of the family’s right to assert a privacy interest in the information at issue. As of this date, we have not received correspondence from any member of the deceased individual’s family asserting a privacy interest in the information.

Thus, we have no basis for determining a family member has a privacy interest in the information at issue. Therefore, the city may not withhold any of the remaining information under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with constitutional privacy and the holding in *Favish*.

Section 552.130 of the Government Code provides information relating to a motor vehicle operator's license, driver's license, motor vehicle title or registration, or personal identification document issued by an agency of this state or another state or country is excepted from public release.¹ See Gov't Code § 552.130. Accordingly, the city must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code.

In summary, the city must withhold all living public citizens' dates of birth under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The city must withhold the motor vehicle record information we have marked under section 552.130 of the Government Code. The city must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open-government/members-public/what-expect-after-ruling-issued> or call the OAG's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Public Information Act may be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the OAG, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

Meredith L. Coffman
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

MLC/be

Ref: ID# 924306

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)

¹ The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. See Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).