



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

September 20, 2019

Ms. Amy Bass-Domel
Open Records
Williamson County Sheriff's Office
508 South Rock Street
Georgetown, Texas 78626

OR2019-26390

Dear Ms. Bass-Domel:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 786857.

The Williamson County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office") received a request for the requestor's commissary account, visitor's list, and list of calls made and their charges. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.130 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from public disclosure "information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision." Gov't Code § 552.101. This section encompasses the constitutional right to privacy. Constitutional privacy protects two kinds of interests. *See Whalen v. Roe*, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Open Records Decision Nos. 600 at 3-5 (1992), 478 at 4 (1987), 455 at 3-7 (1987). The first is the interest in independence in making certain important decisions related to the "zones of privacy," pertaining to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education, that have been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. *See Fajjo v. Coon*, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981); ORD 455 at 3-7. The second constitutionally protected privacy interest is in freedom from public disclosure of certain personal matters. *See Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Tex.*, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985); ORD 455 at 6-7. This aspect of constitutional privacy balances the individual's privacy interest against the public's interest in the information. *See* ORD 455 at 7. Constitutional privacy under section 552.101 is reserved for "the most intimate aspects of human affairs." *Id.* at 8 (quoting *Ramie*, 765 F.2d at 492).

This office has applied privacy to protect certain information about incarcerated individuals. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 430 (1985), 428 (1985), 185 (1978). Citing *State v. Ellefson*, 224 S.E.2d 666 (S.C. 1976) as authority, this office held that those individuals who correspond with inmates possess a “first amendment right . . . to maintain communication with [the inmate] free of the threat of public exposure;” and that this right would be violated by the release of information that identifies those correspondents, because such a release would discourage correspondence. ORD 185. The information at issue in Open Records Decision No. 185 was the identities of individuals who had corresponded with inmates, and our office found that “the public’s right to obtain an inmate’s correspondence list is not sufficient to overcome the first amendment right of the inmate’s correspondents to maintain communication with him free of the threat of public exposure.” ORD 185. Implicit in this holding is the fact that an individual’s association with an inmate may be intimate or embarrassing. In Open Records Decision Nos. 428 and 430, our office determined that inmate visitor and mail logs which identify inmates and those who choose to visit or correspond with inmates are protected by constitutional privacy because people who correspond with inmates have a First Amendment right to do so that would be threatened if their names were released. ORDs 428 and 430. Further, we recognized that inmates had a constitutional right to visit with outsiders and could also be threatened if their names were released. *See also* ORD 185. The rights of those individuals to anonymity was found to outweigh the public’s interest in this information. *Id.*; *see* ORD 430 (list of inmate visitors protected by constitutional privacy of both inmate and visitors).

Although the requestor’s information is at issue, the requestor does not have a right of access to this information under section 552.023 of the Government Code because the constitutional rights of the other parties are also implicated. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.023(a) (person or person’s authorized representative has special right of access, beyond right of general public, to information held by governmental body that relates to the person and is protected from public disclosure by laws intended to protect that person’s privacy interests); *see also* ORD 430 (list of inmate visitors protected by constitutional privacy of both inmate and visitors). Accordingly, the sheriff’s office must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the constitutional right to privacy.¹

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that (1) contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) is not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. In Open Records Decision No. 396 (1983), we considered whether financial records relating to inmate trust accounts and financial transactions with

¹As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your remaining arguments against disclosure of this information.


the commissary of the county jail were protected by common-law privacy. *See* ORD 396. We reasoned “the sheriff acts merely in the capacity of trustee for the inmates” in such transactions, and determined such information is protected under common-law privacy as background financial information under the standard of Open Records Decision No. 373 (1983). ORD 396 at 1. We concluded there is not a sufficient legitimate public interest with regard to such information to overcome the inmate's common-law right to privacy about the inmate's financial affairs. *Id.* at 1-2. However, we note the remaining information you seek to withhold consists of the requestor’s information. The requestor has a right of access to this information pursuant to section 552.023 of the Government Code. *See* Gov’t Code § 552.023; Open Records Decision No. 481 at 4 (1987) (privacy theories not implicated when individual requests information concerning himself). Thus, we find the sheriff’s office may not withhold the remaining information under section 552.101 of the Government Code on that basis.

In summary, the sheriff’s office must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with constitutional privacy. The sheriff’s office must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open-government/members-public/what-expect-after-ruling-issued> or call the OAG’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Public Information Act may be directed to the Cost Rules Administrator of the OAG, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Thana Hussaini
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

TSH/gw

Ref: ID# 786857

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)