



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

April 18, 2019

Mr. William Turner
Public Information Officer
Texas Commission on Jail Standards
P.O. Box 12985
Austin, Texas 78711

OR2019-10512

Dear Mr. Turner:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 760185 (Ref. No. 2019-2-1).

The Texas Commission on Jail Standards (the "commission") received a request for information pertaining to a specified investigation involving a named individual. You state the commission has released some information to the requestor. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.137, and 552.139 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.¹ We have also received and considered comments submitted by the requestor. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (providing that interested party may submit written comments regarding why information should or should not be released).

Initially, we note the requestor is a representative of Disability Rights Texas ("DRT"), which has been designated as the state's protection and advocacy system ("P&A system") for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act

¹We assume the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

("PAIMI Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act ("DDA Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act ("PAIR Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.2 (defining "designated official" and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), .22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI Act provides, in relevant part, that DRT, as the state's P&A system, shall

(1) have the authority to—

(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred[.]

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). Further, the PAIMI Act provides DRT shall

(4) . . . have access to all records of—

...

(B) any individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts are unknown)—

(i) who by reason of the mental or physical condition of such individual is unable to authorize the [P&A system] to have such access;

(ii) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or for whom the legal guardian is the State; and

(iii) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the [P&A system] or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities (either of which result from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iii). The term "records" as used in the above-quoted provision includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents

of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records. *Id.* § 10806(b)(3)(A); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c) (addressing P&A system's access to records under PAIMI). Further, the PAIMI Act defines the term "facilities" and states the term "may include, but need not be limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, community facilities for individuals with mental illness, board and care homes, homeless shelters, and jails and prisons." 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of—

...

(ii) any individual with a developmental disability, in a situation in which—

(I) the individual, by reason of such individual's mental or physical condition, is unable to authorize the system to have such access;

(II) the individual does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or the legal guardian of the individual is the State; and

(III) a complaint has been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status or treatment of the individual or, as a result of monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(ii). The DDA Act states the term "record" includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

Id. § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).

In this instance, DRT states the individual named in the request is a person with a mental illness who was abused while being restrained in the Victoria County Jail. DRT further states it has filed a complaint with the commission on behalf of the named individual. DRT explains it intends to investigate the incident regarding possible abuse or neglect of an individual with a mental illness as defined by federal law. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 10802(4) (defining term “individual with mental illness”). DRT indicates the individual at issue does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative acting on his behalf with regard to the investigation of possible abuse and neglect. We note Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 concluded, based on the plain language of federal statutes and regulations, the underlying purpose of the PAIMI and the DDA Act, and court interpretations of these laws, a P&A system may have access to individuals with mental illness or developmental disabilities and their records irrespective of guardian consent. Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002). Additionally, DRT indicates it has probable cause to believe the individual’s injuries may have been the result of abuse and neglect. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.2 (stating that the probable cause decision under PAIMI may be based on reasonable inference drawn from one’s experience or training regarding similar incidents, conditions or problems that are usually associated with abuse or neglect).

A state statute is preempted by federal law to the extent it conflicts with that federal law. *See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Orange*, 905 F. Supp. 381, 382 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Further, federal regulations provide that state law must not diminish the required authority of a P&A system. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(f); *see also Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard*, 21A F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (broad right of access under section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code applies despite existence of any state or local laws or regulations which attempt to restrict access; although state law may expand authority of P&A system, state law cannot diminish authority set forth in federal statutes); *Iowa Pros. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen*, 206 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Iowa 2001); *cf.* 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C). Similarly, Texas law states, “[n]otwithstanding other state law, [a P&A system] . . . is entitled to access to records relating to persons with mental illness to the extent authorized by federal law.” Health & Safety Code § 615.002(a). Thus, the PAIMI and the DDA Act grant DRT access to “records,” and, to the extent state law provides for the confidentiality of “records” requested by DRT, its federal rights of access

under the PAIMI and the DDA Act preempt state law. *See* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c); *see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n*, 905 F. Supp. at 382. Accordingly, we must address whether the information at issue constitutes “records” of an individual with a mental illness as defined by the PAIMI or a disability as defined by the DDA Act.

Although the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code, we do not believe Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary.² Such a reading of the statute would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. *See Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress’s evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in enacting the PAIMI and the DDA Act. *See Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history), *see generally Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress’s plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress’s intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress’s words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem). Based on this analysis, we believe the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. *See Penn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that the definition of ‘records’ in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A system] ‘shall have access’ under § 10805[.]”).

We note the submitted information consists of reports prepared in rendering care and an administrative investigation into the injuries of the named individual during his incarceration. Thus, in this instance, even though the commission claims this information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.137, and 552.139 of the Government Code, these claims are preempted by the PAIMI and the DDA. Accordingly, based on the requestor’s representations, we determine that DRT has a right of access to the submitted information pursuant to subsections (a)(1)(A) and (a)(4)(A) of section 10805 of title 42 of the United States Code and subsections (a)(2)(B), (I), and (J)(i) of section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code. Thus, the commission must release the submitted information to this requestor.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

²Use of the term “includes” in section 10806(b)(3)(A) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically listed in that section. *See St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Blake Brennan', written in a cursive style.

Blake Brennan
Attorney
Open Records Division

BB/gw

Ref: ID# 760185

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)