



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

September 27, 2017

Mr. Jerry E. Drake, Jr.  
First Assistant City Attorney  
City of Denton  
215 East McKinney  
Denton, Texas 76201

OR2017-22157

Dear Mr. Drake:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 677822.

The City of Denton (the "city") received a request for (1) all correspondence sent or received by a named individual during a specified time period, (2) the calendar appointments of a named individual during a specified time period, and (3) all records relating to a specified closed meeting.<sup>1</sup> The city states it will make some information available to the requestor. The city claims some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101, 552.107, and 552.111 of the Government Code. We have considered the claimed exceptions and reviewed the submitted information.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. *See* Gov't Code § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open

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<sup>1</sup>The city states it sought and received clarification of the information requested. *See* Gov't Code § 552.222 (providing if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); *see also City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or overbroad request for information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The city states some of the submitted information consists of a communication involving attorneys for the city and city employees and officials that was made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services. The city states this communication was intended to be, and has remained, confidential. Based on the city’s representations and our review, we find the city has demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the communication at issue. Accordingly, the city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.<sup>2</sup>

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which

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<sup>2</sup>As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the city’s remaining arguments against disclosure of this information.


protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation. Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See* Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). Upon review, we find portions of the remaining information satisfy the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Therefore, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. However, we find the city has not demonstrated any of the remaining information is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Thus, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy.

In summary, the city may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The city must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Gerald A. Arismendez  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

GAA/tdw

Ref: ID# 677822

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)