



**KEN PAXTON**  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

September 7, 2017

Mr. Oscar G. Treviño  
Counsel for the Dripping Springs Independent School District  
Walsh Gallegos Treviño Russo & Kyle, P.C.  
P.O. Box 2156  
Austin, Texas 78768-2156

OR2017-20352

Dear Mr. Treviño:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 674574.

The Dripping Springs Independent School District (the "district"), which you represent, received a request for specified communications pertaining to a named family during a specified period of time. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.107 of the Government Code. We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.<sup>1</sup>

Initially, we note the United States Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office has informed this office the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act ("FERPA"), section 1232g of title 20 of the United States Code, does not permit state and local educational authorities to disclose to this office, without parental or an adult student's consent, unredacted, personally identifiable information contained in education records for

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<sup>1</sup>We assume that the "representative sample" of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

the purpose of our review in the open records ruling process under the Act.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, state and local educational authorities that receive a request for education records from a member of the public under the Act must not submit education records to this office in unredacted form, that is, in a form in which “personally identifiable information” is disclosed. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining “personally identifiable information”). You have submitted unredacted education records for our review. Because our office is prohibited from reviewing these education records to determine whether appropriate redactions under FERPA have been made, we will not address the applicability of FERPA to any of the submitted records, except to note parents have a right of access under FERPA to their children’s education records. *See* 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3; *see also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. City of Orange, Tex.*, 905 F. Supp. 381, 382 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (FERPA prevails over inconsistent provision of state law). The Department of Education has informed us, however, that a parent’s right of access under FERPA to information about the parent’s child does not prevail over an educational institution’s right to assert the attorney-client privilege. Therefore, we will consider your argument against disclosure of the submitted information.

Next, we note the requestor specifically excluded e-mails sent by herself. Thus, the portion of the submitted information that consists of an e-mail sent from the requestor is not responsive to the present request. This ruling does not address the public availability of any information that is not responsive to the request, and the district is not required to release that information in response to the request.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. *See* Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus,

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<sup>2</sup>A copy of this letter may be found on the Office of the Attorney General’s website at: <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/og/20060725usdoe.pdf>.

a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *See Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state the responsive information consists of communications between attorneys for the district and district employees that were made for the purpose of providing legal services to the district. You state the communications were intended to be confidential and have remained confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find the responsive information consists of privileged attorney-client communications. Therefore, the district may withhold the responsive information under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Erin Groff  
Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

EMG/som

Ref: ID# 674574

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)