



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

April 19, 2017

Mr. Andrew Wipke
Assistant District Attorney
County of Lubbock
904 Broadway, Second Floor
Lubbock, Texas 79401

OR2017-08289

Dear Mr. Wipke:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 654099 (ORR.145).

The Lubbock County District Attorney's Office (the "district attorney's office") received a request for information pertaining to the purchase of election equipment by Lubbock County (the "county").¹ The district attorney's office claims some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.107 and 552.111 of the Government Code. Additionally, the district attorney's office states release of the submitted information may implicate the proprietary interests of Hart InterCivic, Inc. ("Hart"). Accordingly, the district

¹The district attorney's office states it sought and received clarification of the information requested. See Gov't Code § 552.222 (providing if request for information is unclear, governmental body may ask requestor to clarify request); see also *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when a governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of an unclear or overbroad request for information, the ten-day period to request an attorney general ruling is measured from the date the request is clarified or narrowed).

attorney's office states, and provides documentation showing, it notified Hart of the request for information and of its right to submit arguments to this office as to why the submitted information should not be released. *See* Gov't Code § 552.305(d); *see also* Open Records Decision No. 542 (1990) (statutory predecessor to section 552.305 permits governmental body to rely on interested third party to raise and explain applicability of exception in the Act in certain circumstances). We have received comments from Hart. We have reviewed the submitted information and the submitted arguments.

Section 552.104(a) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "information that, if released, would give advantage to a competitor or bidder." Gov't Code § 552.104(a). In considering whether a private third party may assert this exception, the supreme court reasoned because section 552.305(a) of the Government Code includes section 552.104 as an example of an exception that involves a third party's property interest, a private third party may invoke this exception. *Boeing Co. v. Paxton*, 466 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2015). The "test under section 552.104 is whether knowing another bidder's [or competitor's information] would be an advantage, not whether it would be a decisive advantage." *Id.* at 841. Hart states it has competitors. In addition, Hart states release of its information at issue "will allow [its] competitors to accurately estimate and undercut [its] future bids, harm [its] ability to bid and negotiate competitive contracts, harm [its] negotiating interests, and compromise [its] procurement processes," and seeks to withhold the terms of the contract. For many years, this office concluded the terms of a contract and especially the pricing of a winning bidder are public and generally not excepted from disclosure. Gov't Code § 552.022(a)(3) (contract involving receipt or expenditure of public funds expressly made public); Open Records Decision Nos. 541 at 8 (1990) (public has interest in knowing terms of contract with state agency), 514 (1988) (public has interest in knowing prices charged by government contractors), 494 (1988) (requiring balancing of public interest in disclosure with competitive injury to company). *See generally* Freedom of Information Act Guide & Privacy Act Overview, 219 (2000) (federal cases applying analogous Freedom of Information Act reasoning that disclosure of prices charged government is a cost of doing business with government). However, now, pursuant to *Boeing*, section 552.104 is not limited to only ongoing competitive situations, and a third party need only show release of its competitively sensitive information would give an advantage to a competitor even after a contract is executed. *Boeing*, 466 S.W.3d at 841. After review of the information at issue and consideration of the arguments, we find Hart has established the release of the information at issue would give advantage to a competitor or bidder. Thus, we conclude the district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked and indicated under section 552.104(a) of the Government Code.²

²As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the district attorney's office's arguments against disclosure of this information.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. *See* Gov't Code § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The district attorney's office states a portion of the submitted information consists of communications involving attorneys for the county and county employees and officials in their capacities as clients. The district attorney's office states these communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the county. The district attorney's office states these communications were intended to be, and have remained, confidential. Based on the district attorney's office's representations and our review, we find it has demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the information at

issue. Accordingly, the district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.³

Section 552.111 of the Government Code excepts from disclosure “[a]n interagency or intraagency memorandum or letter that would not be available by law to a party in litigation with the agency[.]” Gov’t Code § 552.111. This exception encompasses the deliberative process privilege. *See* Open Records Decision No. 615 at 2 (1993). The purpose of section 552.111 is to protect advice, opinion, and recommendation in the decisional process and to encourage open and frank discussion in the deliberative process. *See Austin v. City of San Antonio*, 630 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Open Records Decision No. 538 at 1-2 (1990).

In Open Records Decision No. 615, this office re-examined the statutory predecessor to section 552.111 in light of the decision in *Texas Department of Public Safety v. Gilbreath*, 842 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). We determined section 552.111 excepts from disclosure only those internal communications that consist of advice, recommendations, opinions, and other material reflecting the policymaking processes of the governmental body. *See* ORD 615 at 5. A governmental body’s policymaking functions do not encompass routine internal administrative or personnel matters, and disclosure of information about such matters will not inhibit free discussion of policy issues among agency personnel. *Id.*; *see also City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News*, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2000) (section 552.111 not applicable to personnel-related communications that did not involve policymaking). A governmental body’s policymaking functions do include administrative and personnel matters of broad scope that affect the governmental body’s policy mission. *See* Open Records Decision No. 631 at 3 (1995).

Further, section 552.111 does not protect facts and written observations of facts and events that are severable from advice, opinions, and recommendations. *Arlington Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Attorney Gen.*, 37 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); *see* ORD 615 at 5. But if factual information is so inextricably intertwined with material involving advice, opinion, or recommendation as to make severance of the factual data impractical, the factual information also may be withheld under section 552.111. *See* Open Records Decision No. 313 at 3 (1982).

Section 552.111 can also encompass communications between a governmental body and a third party, including a consultant or other party with a privity of interest. *See* Open Records Decision No. 561 at 9 (1990) (section 552.111 encompasses communications with party with which governmental body has privity of interest or common deliberative process). For section 552.111 to apply, the governmental body must identify the third party and explain

³As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the district attorney's office's remaining argument against disclosure of this information.

the nature of its relationship with the governmental body. Section 552.111 is not applicable to a communication between the governmental body and a third party unless the governmental body establishes it has a privity of interest or common deliberative process with the third party. *See* ORD 561. We note a governmental body does not share a privity of interest with a third party when the governmental body and the third party are involved in contract negotiations, as the parties' interests are adverse.


The district attorney's office states a portion of the information consists of communications between county employees and Hart. The district attorney's office explains this information is reflective of "the deliberative process by which [c]ounty personnel and members of [Hart] discussed and negotiated th[e] contract for election equipment and software." The district attorney's office further explains the county shares a privity of interest with Hart since Hart supplies the county with election equipment and software. Thus, the district attorney's office states the information at issue consists of advice, opinions, and recommendations relating to the policymaking functions of the county. Based on the district attorney's office's representations and our review of the information at issue, we find the district attorney's office has demonstrated portions of the information at issue consist of advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the county. Thus, the district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. Upon review, however, we find the remaining information at issue is general administrative and purely factual information or does not pertain to policymaking. Additionally, we find some of the remaining information at issue consists of communications related to contract negotiations between the county and Hart, and thus, their interests were adverse as to the negotiations and there is no privity of interest between the two parties. Further, some of the remaining information was received from individuals with whom the district attorney's office has not demonstrated the county shares a privity of interest or common deliberative process. Thus, we find the district attorney's office has failed to show the remaining information at issue consists of internal communications containing advice, opinions, or recommendations on the policymaking matters of the county. Accordingly, the district attorney's office may not withhold the remaining information at issue under section 552.111 of the Government Code.

In summary, the district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked and indicated under section 552.104(a) of the Government Code. The district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The district attorney's office may withhold the information we have marked under section 552.111 of the Government Code. The district attorney's office must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Gerald A. Arismendez
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

GAA/som

Ref: ID# 654099

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)

Third Party
(w/o enclosures)