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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

February 8, 2017

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OR2017-02816

Dear Ms. Alexander:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 644990 (Ref. Stafford 16-012).

The City of Stafford (the "city"), which you represent, received a request for all records pertaining to a specified complaint. You state the city has released some information to the requestor. You claim some of the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.107 of the Government Code. Additionally, you provide documentation showing you have notified an interested third party of her right to submit comments to this office why the submitted information should not be released. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (interested party may submit comments stating why information should or should not be released). We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information. We have also received and considered comments from the third party.<sup>1</sup>

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. *See* Gov't Code § 552.107(1). When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made "to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services" to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not

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<sup>1</sup>Although the third party raises section 552.108 of the Government Code, the third party has not provided any arguments to support this exception. Therefore, we assume the third party has withdrawn her claim this section applies to the submitted information. *See* Gov't Code §§ 552.301, .302.

apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a *confidential* communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the *intent* of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

You state Exhibit 3 consists of communications involving attorneys for the city and city employees and officials in their capacities as clients. You state these communications were made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the city. You state these communications were intended to be, and have remained, confidential. Based on your representations and our review, we find you have demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to Exhibit 3. Accordingly, the city may withhold Exhibit 3 under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts from public disclosure “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. The city and third party both raise section 552.101 in conjunction with the common-law right of privacy, which protects information that is 1) highly intimate or embarrassing, such that its release would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and 2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976). Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. *See Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987)*.

In *Morales v. Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied), the court addressed the applicability of the common-law privacy doctrine to files of an investigation of allegations of sexual harassment. The investigation files in *Ellen* contained individual

witness statements, an affidavit by the individual accused of the misconduct responding to the allegations, and conclusions of the board of inquiry that conducted the investigation. *Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525. The court ordered the release of the affidavit of the person under investigation and the conclusions of the board of inquiry, stating the public's interest was sufficiently served by the disclosure of such documents. *Id.* In concluding, the *Ellen* court held "the public did not possess a legitimate interest in the identities of the individual witnesses, nor the details of their personal statements beyond what is contained in the documents that have been ordered released." *Id.* Thus, if there is an adequate summary of an investigation of alleged sexual harassment, the investigation summary must be released under *Ellen*, along with the statement of the accused. However, the identities of the victims and witnesses of the alleged sexual harassment must be redacted, and their detailed statements must be withheld from disclosure. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 393 (1983), 339 (1982). However, when no adequate summary exists, detailed statements regarding the allegations must be released, but the identities of victims and witnesses must still be redacted from the statements. In either case, the identity of the individual accused of sexual harassment is not protected from public disclosure. We also note supervisors are generally not witnesses for purposes of *Ellen*, except where their statements appear in a non-supervisory context.

The information submitted as Exhibit 4 consists of an investigation into an alleged sexual harassment. Upon review, we determine Exhibit 4 contains an adequate summary of the alleged sexual harassment investigation. The summary is not confidential under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy; however, information within the summary identifying the victim must be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. *See Ellen*, 840 S.W.2d at 525. Therefore, pursuant to section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and the holding in *Ellen*, the city must withhold the identifying information of the victim, which we have marked, within the adequate summary. Furthermore, because there is an adequate summary, the city must also withhold the remaining information in Exhibit 4, which we have marked, under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy and the holding in *Ellen*.<sup>2</sup>

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses federal law such as the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA"), which the third party raises for the remaining information. *See* 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 *et. seq.* Section 825.500 of chapter V of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations identifies the record-keeping requirements for employers that are subject to the FMLA. Subsection (g) of section 825.500 states:

[r]ecords and documents relating to certifications, recertifications or medical histories of employees or employees' family members, created for purposes of FMLA, shall be maintained as confidential medical records in separate

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<sup>2</sup>As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the remaining arguments against disclosure of this information.

files/records from the usual personnel files, and if the [Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”)], as amended, is also applicable, such records shall be maintained in conformance with ADA confidentiality requirements[], except that:

- (1) Supervisors and managers may be informed regarding necessary restrictions on the work or duties of an employee and necessary accommodations;
- (2) First aid and safety personnel may be informed (when appropriate) if the employee’s physical or medical condition might require emergency treatment; and
- (3) Government officials investigating compliance with FMLA (or other pertinent law) shall be provided relevant information upon request.

29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g). Upon review, we conclude some of the remaining information, which we have marked, is confidential under section 825.500 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Further, we find none of the release provisions of the FMLA apply to this information. Accordingly, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the FMLA.<sup>3</sup> However, we find the third party has failed to demonstrate the FMLA applies to any of the remaining information. Therefore, the city may not withhold the remaining information under section 552.101 in conjunction with the FMLA.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), which the third party also raises for the remaining information. At the direction of Congress, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) promulgated regulations setting privacy standards for medical records, which HHS issued as the Federal Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information. *See* HIPAA, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (Supp. IV 1998) (historical & statutory note); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. Pts. 160, 164 (“Privacy Rule”); *see also* Attorney General Opinion JC-0508 at 2 (2002). These standards govern the releasability of protected health information by a covered entity. *See* 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164. Under these standards, a covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information, excepted as provided by parts 160 and 164 of the Code of Federal Regulations. *Id.* § 164.502(a).

This office has addressed the interplay of the Privacy Rule and the Act. Open Records Decision No. 681 (2004). In that decision, we noted section 164.512 of title 45 of the Code

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<sup>3</sup>As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the remaining arguments against disclosure of this information.

of Federal Regulations provides a covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to the extent such use or disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant requirements of such law. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1). We further noted the Act “is a mandate in Texas law that compels Texas governmental bodies to disclose information to the public.” See ORD 681 at 8; see also Gov’t Code §§ 552.002, .003, .021. We therefore held the disclosures under the Act come within section 164.512(a). Consequently, the Privacy Rule does not make information confidential for the purpose of section 552.101 of the Government Code. See *Abbott v Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation*, 212 S.W.3d 648 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.); ORD 681 at 9; see also Open Records Decision No. 478 (1987) (as general rule, statutory confidentiality requires express language making information confidential). Because the Privacy Rule does not make confidential information that is subject to disclosure under the Act, the city may not withhold any portion of the remaining information under section 552.101 in conjunction with HIPAA.

As previously noted, section 552.101 of the Government Code encompasses common-law privacy, which is subject to the two-part test discussed above. *Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. Types of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court are delineated in *Industrial Foundation*. *Id.* at 683. Additionally, this office has concluded some kinds of medical information are generally highly intimate or embarrassing. See Open Records Decision No. 455 (1987). Upon review, we find the information we have marked satisfies the standard articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in *Industrial Foundation*. Therefore, the city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.<sup>4</sup> However, we find you have not demonstrated any of the remaining information you have marked is highly intimate or embarrassing and not of legitimate public concern. Thus, none of the remaining information may be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy.

The third party also raises section 552.102(a) of the Government Code, which excepts from disclosure “information in a personnel file, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Gov’t Code § 552.102(a). We understand the third party to assert the privacy analysis under section 552.102(a) is the same as the common-law privacy test under section 552.101 of the Government Code, which is discussed above. See *Indus. Found.*, 540 S.W.2d at 685. In *Hubert v. Harte-Hanks Texas Newspapers, Inc.*, 652 S.W.2d 546, 549-51 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.), the court of appeals ruled the privacy test under section 552.102(a) is the same as the *Industrial Foundation* privacy test. However, the Texas Supreme Court has expressly disagreed with *Hubert’s* interpretation of section 552.102(a), and held the privacy standard under section 552.102(a) differs from the *Industrial Foundation* test under section 552.101. See *Tex. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts v. Attorney Gen. of Tex.*, 354 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2010).

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<sup>4</sup>As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address the remaining argument against disclosure of this information.

The supreme court also considered the applicability of section 552.102(a) and held it excepts from disclosure the dates of birth of state employees in the payroll database of the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. *See id.* at 348. Upon review, we find the remaining information is not subject to section 552.102(a) of the Government Code. Accordingly, the city may not withhold any of the remaining information on that basis.

In summary, the city may withhold Exhibit 3 under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The city must withhold the information we have marked in Exhibit 4 under section 552.101 in conjunction with common-law privacy and the holding in *Ellen*. The city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the FMLA. The city must withhold the information we have marked under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy. The city must release the remaining information.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at [http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl\\_ruling\\_info.shtml](http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml), or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



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Assistant Attorney General  
Open Records Division

GAA/som

Ref: ID# 644990

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor  
(w/o enclosures)

Third Party  
(w/o enclosures)