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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

January 4, 2016

Mr. Ben L. Stool
Counsel for Irving Independent School District
Boyle & Lowry, L.L.P.
4201 Wingren Drive, Suite 108
Irving, Texas 75062

OR2016-00095

Dear Mr. Stool:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 592809.

The Irving Independent School District (the "district"), which you represent, received a request for all e-mails containing a specified name during a specified time period.¹ You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under section 552.107 of the

¹You state the district sought and received clarification of the request for information. *See* Gov't Code § 552.222(b) (stating governmental body may communicate with requestor for purpose of clarifying or narrowing request for information); *see also* *City of Dallas v. Abbott*, 304 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. 2010) (holding that when governmental entity, acting in good faith, requests clarification or narrowing of unclear or over-broad request for public information, ten-day period to request attorney general ruling is measured from date request is clarified or narrowed).

Government Code.² We have considered the exception you claim and reviewed the submitted representative sample of information.³

Initially, you state you have withheld some information pursuant to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a). The United States Department of Education Family Policy Compliance Office has informed this office FERPA does not permit state and local educational authorities to disclose to this office, without parental or an adult student’s consent, unredacted, personally identifiable information contained in education records for the purpose of our review in the open records ruling process under the Act.⁴ Consequently, state and local educational authorities that receive a request for education records from a member of the public under the Act must not submit education records to this office in unredacted form, that is, in a form in which “personally identifiable information” is disclosed. *See* 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (defining “personally identifiable information”). You have submitted unredacted education records for our review. Because our office is prohibited from reviewing these education records to determine whether appropriate redactions under FERPA have been made, we will not address the applicability of FERPA to any of the submitted records. *See* 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(1)(A). Such determinations under FERPA must be made by the educational authority in possession of the education records.⁵ However, we will consider your arguments against disclosure of the submitted information.

We also note a portion of the submitted information, which we have marked, is not responsive to the instant request because it does not contain the name specified in the request. This ruling does not address the public availability of any information that is not responsive to the request, and the district is not required to release such information in response to this request.

Section 552.107(1) of the Government Code protects information coming within the attorney-client privilege. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body

²Although we understand you to raise section 552.103 of the Government Code based on your markings, you have not provided any arguments to support this exception. Thus, we assume the district has withdrawn its claim section 552.103 applies to the submitted information. *See* Gov’t Code §§ 552.301, .302. Additionally, although you raise section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with the attorney-client privilege, this office has concluded that section 552.101 does not encompass discovery privileges. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 676 at 1-2 (2002), 575 at 2 (1990).

³We assume the “representative sample” of records submitted to this office is truly representative of the requested records as a whole. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 499 (1988), 497 (1988). This open records letter does not reach, and therefore does not authorize the withholding of, any other requested records to the extent that those records contain substantially different types of information than that submitted to this office.

⁴A copy of this letter may be found on the Office of the Attorney General’s website at <http://www.oag.state.tx.us/open/20060725usdoe.pdf>.

⁵In the future, if the district does obtain parental consent to submit unredacted education records and the district seeks a ruling from this office on the proper redaction of those education records in compliance with FERPA, we will rule accordingly.

has the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. *Id.* at 7. Second, the communication must have been made “to facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” to the client governmental body. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. *In re Tex. Farmers Ins. Exch.*, 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, *id.* 503(b)(1), meaning it was “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those: (A) to whom disclosure is made to further the rendition of professional legal services to the client; or (B) reasonably necessary to transmit the communication.” *Id.* 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. *Osborne v. Johnson*, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig. proceeding). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. *See Huie v. DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein).

The district states some of the submitted information consists of communications between district employees and attorneys for the district. The district states the communications were made in confidence for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the district and these communications have remained confidential. Upon review, we find the district has demonstrated the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to some of the submitted communications. However, upon review, we find the remaining responsive information does not constitute or document communications for section 552.107(1) purposes or it consists of communications with individuals the district has not demonstrated are privileged parties. Therefore, the district may generally withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1). However, we note some of the otherwise privileged e-mail strings include e-mails sent to non-privileged parties. Furthermore, if these e-mails are removed from the e-mail strings and stand alone, they are responsive to the instant request. Therefore, if the district maintains these non-privileged e-mails, which we have marked, separate and apart from the otherwise privileged e-mail strings in which they appear, then the district may not withhold the non-privileged e-mails under section 552.107(1).

To the extent the non-privileged e-mails exist separate and apart from the otherwise privileged e-mail strings in which they appear, we note portions of the e-mails are subject to section 552.137 of the Government Code.⁶ Section 552.137 excepts from disclosure “an e-mail address of a member of the public that is provided for the purpose of communicating electronically with a governmental body” unless the member of the public consents to its release or the e-mail address is of a type specifically excluded by subsection (c). *See* Gov’t Code § 552.137(a)-(c). The e-mail addresses at issue are not excluded by subsection (c). Therefore, the district must withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137, unless the owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure.

In summary, the district may generally withhold the information we have marked under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. However, if the district maintains the non-privileged e-mails, which we have marked, separate and apart from the otherwise privileged e-mail strings in which they appear, then the district may not withhold the non-privileged e-mails under section 552.107(1) of the Government Code. The district must withhold the e-mail addresses we have marked under section 552.137 of the Government Code, unless the owners affirmatively consent to their public disclosure. As no other exceptions to disclosure have been raised, the remaining responsive information must be released.

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General’s Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Cole Hutchison
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

CH/bhf

⁶The Office of the Attorney General will raise a mandatory exception on behalf of a governmental body, but ordinarily will not raise other exceptions. *See* Open Records Decision Nos. 481 (1987), 480 (1987), 470 (1987).

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Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)