



KEN PAXTON
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

October 7, 2015

Mr. Matthew L. Grove
Assistant County Attorney
Fort Bend County
401 Jackson Street, 3rd Floor
Richmond, Texas 77469

OR2015-21073

Dear Mr. Grove:

You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under the Public Information Act (the "Act"), chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 582204.

The Fort Bend County Sheriff's Office (the "sheriff's office") received a request for all documentation pertaining to a named individual's incarceration at a specified time and any and all Fort Bend County Jail policies, procedures, directives, protocols, and guidelines pertaining to inmate classification and housing, surveillance of segregation cells, responses to requests for services by inmates, and responses to requests for services by inmate family members in effect for a specified time period. You claim the submitted information is excepted from disclosure under sections 552.101 and 552.108 of the Government Code. We have considered the exceptions you claim and reviewed the submitted information. We have also received and considered comments from the requestor. *See* Gov't Code § 552.304 (interested party may submit comments stating why information should or should not be released).

Initially, we note you have not submitted any information responsive to the requested policies pertaining to responding to requests for services by inmates and inmate family members. Thus, to the extent such information existed and was maintained by the sheriff's office on the date the sheriff's office received the request for information, we presume the sheriff's office has released it. If not, the sheriff's office must do so at this time. *See id.* §§ 552.301, .302; *see also* Open Records Decision No. 664 (2000) (if governmental body concludes that no exceptions apply to the requested information, it must release the information as soon as possible).

Section 552.101 of the Government Code excepts “information considered to be confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision.” Gov’t Code § 552.101. Section 552.101 of the Government Code encompasses chapter 411 of the Government Code, which makes confidential criminal history record information (“CHRI”) generated by the National Crime Information Center or by the Texas Crime Information Center. *See* Act of May 27, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1279, § 21, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4337 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to Gov’t Code §411.083(a)). Title 28, part 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the release of CHRI that states obtain from the federal government or other states. Open Records Decision No. 565 (1990). The federal regulations allow each state to follow its individual laws with respect to the CHRI it generates. *See id.* Section 411.083 of the Government Code deems confidential CHRI the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) maintains, except DPS may disseminate this information as provided in chapter 411, subchapter F of the Government Code. *See* Act of May 27, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 1279, § 21, 2015 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4337 (Vernon) (to be codified as an amendment to Gov’t Code §411.083(a)). Sections 411.083(b)(1) and 411.089(a) authorize a criminal justice agency to obtain CHRI; however, a criminal justice agency may not release CHRI except to another criminal justice agency for a criminal justice purpose. Gov’t Code § 411.089(b)(1). Other entities specified in chapter 411 of the Government Code are entitled to obtain CHRI from DPS or another criminal justice agency; however, those entities may not release CHRI except as provided by chapter 411. *See generally id.* §§ 411.090-.127. Thus, any CHRI obtained from DPS or any other criminal justice agency must be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with chapter 411, subchapter F of the Government Code. However, section 411.083 does not apply to active warrant information or other information relating to one’s current involvement with the criminal justice system. *See id.* § 411.081(b) (police department allowed to disclose information pertaining to person’s current involvement in the criminal justice system). Upon review, we find the information you have highlighted in Exhibit C consists of CHRI for purposes of chapter 411 of the Government Code and federal law. Accordingly, the information you have highlighted in Exhibit C must be withheld under section 552.101 in conjunction with federal law and chapter 411 of the Government Code.¹ However, we find you have failed to demonstrate the remaining information in Exhibit C constitutes CHRI; thus, the sheriff’s office may not withhold it under section 552.101 on that basis.

Section 552.101 of the Government Code also encompasses the doctrine of common-law privacy, which protects information that is (1) highly intimate or embarrassing, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) not of legitimate concern to the public. *Indus. Found. v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd.*, 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976). To demonstrate the applicability of common-law privacy, both prongs of this test must be satisfied. *Id.* at 681-82. A compilation of an individual’s criminal history is highly embarrassing information, the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person. *Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm.*

¹As our ruling is dispositive, we need not address your remaining argument against disclosure for this information.

for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (finding significant privacy interest in compilation of individual's criminal history by recognizing distinction between public records found in courthouse files and local police stations and compiled summary of criminal history information). Furthermore, we find a compilation of a private citizen's criminal history is generally not of legitimate concern to the public. We note, however, active warrant information or other information relating to an individual's current involvement in the criminal justice system does not constitute criminal history information for the purposes of section 552.101. *See* Gov't Code § 411.081(b).

You assert the present request requires the sheriff's office to compile unspecified law enforcement records concerning the individual at issue. However, upon review of the request, we find the requestor is seeking information pertaining to a specified arrest. Accordingly, the request does not implicate the named individual's right to privacy. Therefore, the sheriff's office may not withhold any of the submitted information as a criminal history compilation under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law privacy.

The remaining information in Exhibit C contains fingerprint information. Access to fingerprint information is governed by sections 560.001, 560.002, and 560.003 of the Government Code. Section 560.001 provides in part that "[i]n this chapter . . . '[b]iometric identifier' means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or record of hand or face geometry." *Id.* § 560.001(1). Section 560.003 provides that "[a] biometric identifier in the possession of a governmental body is exempt from disclosure under [the Act]." *Id.* § 560.003. Section 560.002 provides, however, that "[a] governmental body that possesses a biometric identifier of an individual . . . may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person unless . . . the individual consents to the disclosure[.]" *Id.* § 560.002(1)(A). Thus, section 560.002(1)(A) of the Government Code gives an individual or his authorized representative a right of access to his own fingerprint information. We note the requestor has provided an authorization and release form signed by the named individual whose fingerprints are at issue. Thus, the requestor has a right of access to the named individual's fingerprints, which we have marked, under section 560.002(1)(A). Accordingly, the sheriff's office must release the fingerprints we have marked to this requestor under section 560.002 of the Government Code.

Section 552.108(b)(1) of the Government Code excepts from disclosure "[a]n internal record or notation of a law enforcement agency or prosecutor that is maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement or prosecution . . . if . . . release of the internal record or notation would interfere with law enforcement or prosecution[.]" *Id.* § 552.108(b)(1). Section 552.108(b)(1) is intended to protect "information which, if released, would permit private citizens to anticipate weaknesses in a police sheriff's office, avoid detection, jeopardize officer safety, and generally undermine police efforts to effectuate the laws of this State." *City of Fort Worth v. Cornyn*, 86 S.W.3d 320, 327 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). To prevail on its claim that section 552.108(b)(1) excepts information from disclosure, a governmental body must do more than merely make a conclusory assertion that releasing the information would interfere with law enforcement. Instead, the governmental

body must meet its burden of explaining how and why release of the requested information would interfere with law enforcement and crime prevention. *See* Open Records Decision No. 562 at 10 (1990) (construing statutory predecessor). This office has concluded that section 552.108(b) excepts from public disclosure information relating to the security or operation of a law enforcement agency. *See, e.g.*, Open Records Decision Nos. 531 (1989) (release of detailed use of force guidelines would unduly interfere with law enforcement), 252 (1980) (section 552.108 of the Government Code is designed to protect investigative techniques and procedures used in law enforcement), 143 (1976) (disclosure of specific operations or specialized equipment directly related to investigation or detection of crime may be excepted). Section 552.108(b)(1) is not applicable, however, to generally known policies and procedures. *See, e.g.*, ORDs 531 at 2-3 (Penal Code provisions, common law rules, and constitutional limitations on use of force not protected), 252 at 3 (governmental body failed to indicate why investigative procedures and techniques requested were any different from those commonly known).

You state the information in Exhibit D consists of procedures followed by employees for classifying, monitoring, and supervising inmates. You assert release of Exhibit D would interfere with law enforcement because offenders would have detailed information as to how they would be classified and monitored while detained in the Fort Bend County Jail, which would potentially hinder the investigation or prosecution of crimes and place employees in danger. Based on your representations and our review, we find the sheriff's office may withhold the information we have marked in Exhibit D under section 552.108(b)(1) of the Government Code. However, we find you have failed to demonstrate how the remaining information in Exhibit D would interfere with law enforcement or crime prevention. Consequently, the sheriff's office may not withhold the remaining information in Exhibit D under section 552.108(b)(1).

Next, we note the requestor is a representative of Disability Rights Texas ("DRT"), formerly known as Advocacy, Inc. DRT has been designated as the state's protection and advocacy system ("P&A system") for purposes of the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (the "PAIMI Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10801-10851, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (the "DDA Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 15041-15045, and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (the "PAIR Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794e. *See* Tex. Gov. Exec. Order No. DB-33, 2 Tex. Reg. 3713 (1977); Attorney General Opinion JC-0461 (2002); *see also* 42 C.F.R. §§ 51.2 (defining "designated official" and requiring official to designate agency to be accountable for funds of P&A agency), .22 (requiring P&A agency to have a governing authority responsible for control).

The PAIMI Act provides, in relevant part, that DRT, as the state's P&A system, shall

(1) have the authority to—

(A) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred[.]

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(A). Further, the PAIMI Act provides DRT shall

(4) . . . have access to all records of—

...

(B) any individual (including an individual who has died or whose whereabouts are unknown)—

(i) who by reason of the mental or physical condition of such individual is unable to authorize the [P&A system] to have such access;

(ii) who does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or for whom the legal guardian is the State; and

(iii) with respect to whom a complaint has been received by the [P&A system] or with respect to whom as a result of monitoring or other activities (either of which result from a complaint or other evidence) there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 10805(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iii). The term “records” as used in the above-quoted provision

includes reports prepared by any staff of a facility rendering care and treatment [to the individual] or reports prepared by an agency charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility that describe incidents of abuse, neglect, and injury occurring at such facility and the steps taken to investigate such incidents, and discharge planning records.

Id. § 10806(b)(3)(A); *see also* 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c) (addressing P&A system’s access to records under PAIMI). Further, the PAIMI Act defines the term “facilities” and states the term “may include, but need not be limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, community facilities for individuals with mental illness, board and care homes, homeless shelters, and jails and prisons.” 42 U.S.C. § 10802(3). The DDA Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system shall

(B) have the authority to investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with developmental disabilities if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred;

...

(I) have access to all records of—

(ii) any individual with a developmental disability, in a situation in which—

(I) the individual, by reason of such individual's mental or physical condition, is unable to authorize the system to have such access;

(II) the individual does not have a legal guardian, conservator, or other legal representative, or the legal guardian of the individual is the State; and

(III) a complaint has been received by the system about the individual with regard to the status or treatment of the individual or, as a result of monitoring or other activities, there is probable cause to believe that such individual has been subject to abuse or neglect[.]

Id. § 15043(a)(2)(B), (I)(ii). The DDA Act states the term “record” includes

(1) a report prepared or received by any staff at any location at which services, supports, or other assistance is provided to individuals with developmental disabilities;

(2) a report prepared by an agency or staff person charged with investigating reports of incidents of abuse or neglect, injury, or death occurring at such location, that describes such incidents and the steps taken to investigate such incidents; and

(3) a discharge planning record.

Id. § 15043(c). The PAIR Act provides, in relevant part, that a P&A system will “have the same . . . access to records and program income, as are set forth in [the DDA Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 794e(f)(2).

A state statute is preempted by federal law to the extent it conflicts with that federal law. *See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Orange*, 905 F. Supp. 381, 382 (E.D. Tex. 1995). Further, federal regulations provide that state law must not diminish the required authority of a P&A system. *See* 45 C.F.R. § 1386.21(f); *see also Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Gerard*, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (broad right of access under section 15043 of title 42 of the United States Code applies despite existence of any state or local laws or regulations which attempt to restrict access; although state law may expand authority of P&A system, state law cannot diminish authority set forth in federal statutes); *Iowa Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Rasmussen*, 206 F.R.D. 630, 639 (S.D. Iowa

2001); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 10806(b)(2)(C). Similarly, Texas law states, “[n]otwithstanding other state law, [a P&A system] . . . is entitled to access to records relating to persons with mental illness to the extent authorized by federal law.” Health & Safety Code § 615.002(a). Thus, the PAIMI and the DDA Act grant DRT access to “records,” and, to the extent state law provides for the confidentiality of “records” requested by DRT, its federal rights of access under the PAIMI and the DDA Act preempt state law. See 42 C.F.R. § 51.41(c); see also *Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n*, 905 F. Supp. at 382. Accordingly, we must address whether the information at issue constitutes “records” of an individual with a mental illness as defined by the PAIMI or a disability as defined by the DDA Act.

Although the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) of title 42 of the United States Code, we do not believe Congress intended for the definitions to be so expansive as to grant a P&A system access to any information it deems necessary.² Such a reading of the statute would render sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) insignificant. See *Duncan v. Walker*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (statute should be construed in a way that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant). Furthermore, in light of Congress’s evident preference for limiting the scope of access, we are unwilling to assume that Congress meant more than it said in 552.101 enacting the PAIMI and the DDA Act. See *Kofa v. INS*, 60 F.3d 1084 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that statutory construction must begin with language of statute; to do otherwise would assume that Congress does not express its intent in words of statutes, but only by way of legislative history). See generally *Coast Alliance v. Babbitt*, 6 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that if, in following Congress’s plain language in statute, agency cannot carry out Congress’s intent, remedy is not to distort or ignore Congress’s words, but rather to ask Congress to address problem). Based on this analysis, we believe the information specifically described in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c) is indicative of the types of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. See *Penn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun*, 228 F.3d 423, 426 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that the definition of ‘records’ in § 10806 controls the types of records to which [the P&A system] ‘shall have access’ under § 10805[.]”).

The requestor asserts he has a right of access to the information at issue in Exhibits C and D pursuant to the PAIMI Act and the DDA Act. Exhibit C consists of the booking records for the named individual’s incarceration at the Fort Bend County Jail and Exhibit D consists of internal procedures of the sheriff’s office. Thus, Exhibits C and D are being utilized for law enforcement purposes. We note this type of information is not among the information specifically listed as a “record” in sections 10806(b)(3)(A) and 15043(c). Furthermore, we find the submitted information is not the type of information to which Congress intended to grant a P&A system access. Consequently, we find DRT does not have a right of access to the submitted information under either the PAIMI or the DDA Act.

²Use of the term “includes” in section 10806(b)(3)(A) of title 42 of the United States Code indicates the definition of “records” is not limited to the information specifically listed in that section. See *St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co.*, 78 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1996); see also 42 C.F.R. § 51.41.

In summary, the sheriff's office must withhold the information you have highlighted in Exhibit C under 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with Chapter 411 of the Government Code and federal law. The sheriff's office must release the fingerprints we have marked to this requestor under section 560.002 of the Government Code. The sheriff's office may withhold the information we have marked in Exhibit D under 552.108(b)(1) of the Government Code. The sheriff's office must release the remaining information to this requestor.³

This letter ruling is limited to the particular information at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other information or any other circumstances.

This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For more information concerning those rights and responsibilities, please visit our website at http://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/open/orl_ruling_info.shtml, or call the Office of the Attorney General's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. Questions concerning the allowable charges for providing public information under the Act may be directed to the Office of the Attorney General, toll free, at (888) 672-6787.

Sincerely,



Nicole Thomas
Assistant Attorney General
Open Records Division

NT/bhf

Ref: ID# 582204

Enc. Submitted documents

c: Requestor
(w/o enclosures)

³We note the information being released in this instance includes information that may be confidential with respect to the general public. See Gov't Code §§ 552.023(a) (governmental body may not deny access to person to whom information relates or person's agent on ground that information is considered confidential by privacy principles), 560.002(1)(A); Open Records Decision No. 481 at 4 (1987) (privacy theories not implicated when individuals request information concerning themselves). Therefore, if the sheriff's office receives another request for this information from a different requestor, the sheriff's office must again seek a ruling from this office.