 Office of the ATTORNEY GENERAL GREG ABBOTT | |
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August 20, 2003 Ms. Sara Shiplet Waitt
OR2003-5844 Dear Ms. Waitt: You ask whether certain information is subject to required public disclosure under chapter 552 of the Government Code. Your request was assigned ID# 186271. The Texas Department of Insurance (the "department") received a request for copies of all correspondence, electronic and printed, sent to or received from Nationwide Lloyds Insurance Company ("Nationwide") regarding a specified case involving a complaint filed by the requestor. You state that the requestor has been given all reports and correspondence that he has had access to regarding his claim. While you take no position with respect to the release of the submitted information, you state, and provide documentation showing, that in accordance with section 552.305 of the Government Code, the department has notified Nationwide, a third party whose proprietary or property interests may be implicated by this request, of the request for information. See Gov't Code § 552.305 (permitting interested third party to submit to attorney general reasons why requested information should not be released); Open Records Decision No. 542 (1990) (determining that statutory predecessor to section 552.305 permits governmental body to rely on interested third party to raise and explain applicability of exception in Chapter 552 of Government Code in certain circumstances). The department has submitted the information at issue to this office. We have also received correspondence from a representative of Nationwide. We have considered their arguments and reviewed the submitted information. First, we will address Nationwide's argument that the submitted information is excepted under section 552.101 of the Government Code in conjunction with common-law and constitutional privacy. Section 552.101 excepts from disclosure "information made confidential by law, either constitutional, statutory, or by judicial decision," and encompasses the doctrines of common-law and constitutional privacy. Common law privacy protects information if (1) the information contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts the publication of which would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, and (2) the information is not of legitimate concern to the public. Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 685 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977). The type of information considered intimate and embarrassing by the Texas Supreme Court in Industrial Foundation included information relating to sexual assault, pregnancy, mental or physical abuse in the workplace, illegitimate children, psychiatric treatment of mental disorders, attempted suicide, and injuries to sexual organs. Id. at 683. This office has found that the following types of information are excepted from required public disclosure under common-law privacy: some kinds of medical information or information indicating disabilities or specific illnesses, see Open Records Decision Nos. 470 (1987) (illness from severe emotional and job-related stress), 455 (1987) (prescription drugs, illnesses, operations, and physical handicaps), personal financial information not relating to the financial transaction between an individual and a governmental body, see Open Records Decision Nos. 600 (1992), 545 (1990), information concerning the intimate relations between individuals and their family members, see Open Records Decision No. 470 (1987), and identities of victims of sexual abuse, see Open Records Decision Nos. 440 (1986), 393 (1983), 339 (1982). Constitutional privacy consists of two interrelated types of privacy: (1) the right to make certain kinds of decisions independently and (2) an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Open Records Decision No. 455 at 4 (1987). The first type protects an individual's autonomy within "zones of privacy" which include matters related to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. Id. The second type of constitutional privacy requires a balancing between the individual's privacy interests and the public's need to know information of public concern. Id. The scope of information protected is narrower than that under the common law doctrine of privacy; the information must concern the "most intimate aspects of human affairs." Id. at 5 (citing Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985)). After reviewing the submitted information, we are unable to conclude that it contains any information relating to Nationwide's insureds that is protected by common-law or constitutional privacy. As such, no portion of the submitted information may be withheld under section 552.101 of the Government Code and privacy. Nationwide also argues that a portion of the submitted information "contains attorney-client information and is therefore privileged." The proper exception for a claim of attorney-client privilege is section 552.107 of the Government Code. When asserting the attorney-client privilege, a governmental body maintains the burden of providing the necessary facts to demonstrate the elements of the privilege in order to withhold the information at issue. See Open Records Decision No. 676 at 6-7 (2002). First, a governmental body must demonstrate that the information constitutes or documents a communication. See id. at 7. Second, the communication must have been made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to the client governmental body. See Tex. R. Evid. 503(b)(1). The privilege does not apply when an attorney or representative is involved in some capacity other than that of providing or facilitating professional legal services to the client governmental body. See In re Texas Farmers Ins. Exch., 990 S.W.2d 337, 340 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, orig. proceeding) (attorney-client privilege does not apply if attorney acting in a capacity other than that of attorney). Governmental attorneys often act in capacities other than that of professional legal counsel, such as administrators, investigators, or managers. Thus, the mere fact that a communication involves an attorney for the government does not demonstrate this element. Third, the privilege applies only to communications between or among clients, client representatives, lawyers, and lawyer representatives. See Tex. R. Evid. 503(b)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E). Thus, a governmental body must inform this office of the identities and capacities of the individuals to whom each communication at issue has been made. Lastly, the attorney-client privilege applies only to a confidential communication, see id. 503(b)(1), meaning it was "not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication." See id. 503(a)(5). Whether a communication meets this definition depends on the intent of the parties involved at the time the information was communicated. See Osborne v. Johnson, 954 S.W.2d 180, 184 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ). Moreover, because the client may elect to waive the privilege at any time, a governmental body must explain that the confidentiality of a communication has been maintained. Section 552.107(1) generally excepts an entire communication that is demonstrated to be protected by the attorney-client privilege unless otherwise waived by the governmental body. See Huie v. DeShazo , 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996) (privilege extends to entire communication, including facts contained therein). Based on Nationwide's representations and our review of the submitted information, we conclude that Nationwide has not demonstrated that any portion of this information reflects a confidential communication between privileged parties in furtherance of the rendition of legal services to the client. Accordingly, the department may not withhold any portion of the submitted information under section 552.107(1). Furthermore, because portions of the submitted information have been redacted, we cannot read this information and therefore cannot determine if any exception to disclosure applies. Therefore, as Nationwide claims no other exception to disclosure, and the submitted information is not otherwise confidential by law, we conclude the department must release the submitted information in its entirety. This letter ruling is limited to the particular records at issue in this request and limited to the facts as presented to us; therefore, this ruling must not be relied upon as a previous determination regarding any other records or any other circumstances. This ruling triggers important deadlines regarding the rights and responsibilities of the governmental body and of the requestor. For example, governmental bodies are prohibited from asking the attorney general to reconsider this ruling. Gov't Code § 552.301(f). If the governmental body wants to challenge this ruling, the governmental body must appeal by filing suit in Travis County within 30 calendar days. Id. § 552.324(b). In order to get the full benefit of such an appeal, the governmental body must file suit within 10 calendar days. Id. § 552.353(b)(3), (c). If the governmental body does not appeal this ruling and the governmental body does not comply with it, then both the requestor and the attorney general have the right to file suit against the governmental body to enforce this ruling. Id. § 552.321(a). If this ruling requires the governmental body to release all or part of the requested information, the governmental body is responsible for taking the next step. Based on the statute, the attorney general expects that, within 10 calendar days of this ruling, the governmental body will do one of the following three things: 1) release the public records; 2) notify the requestor of the exact day, time, and place that copies of the records will be provided or that the records can be inspected; or 3) notify the requestor of the governmental body's intent to challenge this letter ruling in court. If the governmental body fails to do one of these three things within 10 calendar days of this ruling, then the requestor should report that failure to the attorney general's Open Government Hotline, toll free, at (877) 673-6839. The requestor may also file a complaint with the district or county attorney. Id. § 552.3215(e). If this ruling requires or permits the governmental body to withhold all or some of the requested information, the requestor can appeal that decision by suing the governmental body. Id. § 552.321(a); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath, 842 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex. App.--Austin 1992, no writ). Please remember that under the Act the release of information triggers certain procedures for costs and charges to the requestor. If records are released in compliance with this ruling, be sure that all charges for the information are at or below the legal amounts. Questions or complaints about over-charging must be directed to Hadassah Schloss at the Texas Building and Procurement Commission at (512) 475-2497. If the governmental body, the requestor, or any other person has questions or comments about this ruling, they may contact our office. We note that a third party may challenge this ruling by filing suit seeking to withhold information from a requestor. Gov't Code § 552.325. Although there is no statutory deadline for contacting us, the attorney general prefers to receive any comments within 10 calendar days of the date of this ruling. Sincerely, Sarah I. Swanson
c: Mr. Thomas J. Archer
Ms. Colleen Laich
Mr. Robert F. Scheihing
POST OFFICE BOX 12548, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2548 TEL: (512) 463-2100 WEB: WWW.OAG.STATE.TX.US |