Open Records Decision No. 451
December 12, 1986

	Re:  Whether the Open Records Act, article 6252-17a, V.T.C.S., authorizes the 
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy to withhold information pertaining to a 
pending complaint against a licensee

Mr. Bob E. Bradley
Executive Director
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy
1033 La Posada
Suite 340
Austin, Texas  78752

Dear Mr. Bradley:

	An attorney has asked the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy to release 
information pertaining to his client, a certified public accountant against whom a 
complaint is pending before the board.  You have asked if the Open Records Act, article 
6252-17a, V.T.C.S., authorizes the board to deny this request.  An attorney in the board's 
enforcement division has described this information as follows:

	1.	A computer printout of information compiled by the staff 
of the Enforcement Division from board records concerning the 
licensee and the complaint, i.e., the name and current address of the 
licensee and his attorney, if any; the certificate number of the 
licensee; the complaint number assigned to the file for identification 
purposes; the section numbers of provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct (the Rules) and the Public Accountancy Act of 
1979, as amended (article 41a-1, V.T.C.S., 1981) (the Act) cited in 
the initial inquiry letter; the name and address of the complaining 
party, and, if applicable, of his attorney; the home and business 
telephone numbers of the Respondent and the Complainant; and a 
brief computer synopsis of enforcement activity in the file to date.  
This data is compiled as an interagency memorandum by attorneys 
and their staff in anticipation of litigation.

	2.	Copies of tape recordings and committee reports of the 
Committee on Technical Standards Review.  This advisory 
committee formed by the board under the authority of section 24(a) 
of the Act, meets in executive session to conduct a preliminary 
review of complaints and discussion items submitted to the board in 
contemplation of litigation.  It has no power to take any final action 
-- but it may make recommendations to the board in open session 
concerning the disposition of items on the committee agenda.  The 
recommendations submitted orally to the board are summarized for 
the assistance of the committee chairman in a 'committee report' 
signed by him; tape recordings of the meetings of the committee on 
Technical Standards Review are made by the staff for purposes of 
the accurate drafting of the committee report.  It should be 
emphasized that the inter-agency committee report itself serves as a 
workpaper of an advisory committee meeting in executive session to 
consider matters impacting upon possible future litigation.  It is a 
document designed for interoffice use.

	3.	Telephone logs maintained by attorneys in the Enforcement 
Division.  These 'records' of telephone conversations are kept 
voluntarily and for personal use by attorneys in the Enforcement 
Division in anticipation of litigation.  There is no requirement that 
staff attorneys in the Enforcement Division maintain logs of this 
nature, which are deemed by this office to be attorney work product 
and exempt from discovery.

	The board's attorney has stated:

Inasmuch as the above described documents have been prepared for 
no other reason than anticipation of litigation in quasi-judicial 
and/or judicial settings, it would appear that these documents as 
prepared fall within the purview of [section 3(a)(3) of the Open 
Records Act].

	Section 3(a)(3) excepts information relating to pending or reasonably anticipated 
litigation.  Open Records Decision No. 416 (1984).  At first glance, it would appear that 
this section applies here, and for purposes of this decision we shall assume that it does.  
Section 25 of article 41a-1, however, provides in part:

	Any file maintained or information gathered or received by the 
board concerning a . . . licensee . . . shall be available for inspection 
by that . . . licensee . . . during normal business hours at the offices 
of the board in Austin.  A . . . licensee . . . may by written 
communication authorize the board to make any information about 
that . . . licensee . . . available for inspection by designated persons 
or available for inspection by the public at large.  Except upon such 
written authorization, all information received or gathered by the 
board concerning the qualifications of any licensee or candidate to 
register as a public accountant or to receive a certificate as a 
certified public accountant and all information received or gathered 
by the board concerning a disciplinary proceeding against a licensee 
under Section 22 of this Act prior to a public hearing on the matter 
shall be confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure under [the 
Open Records Act].  (Emphasis added).

V.T.C.S. art. 41a-1, §25.  For present purposes, the relevant part of this section is as 
follows:

Except upon such written authorization . . . all information received 
or gathered by the board concerning a disciplinary proceeding 
against a licensee under Section 22 of this Act prior to a public 
hearing on the matter shall be confidential. . . .

	The emphasized portion of section 25 establishes that the board may withhold 
information concerning a pending disciplinary proceeding against a licensee unless that 
licensee has authorized a designated person to inspect the information.  In this instance, 
the requestor's client has authorized the requestor to inspect the board's materials relating 
to the proceeding against the client.  Therefore, section 25 of article 41a-1 requires the 
board to grant this request.

	It has been suggested that we should construe section 25 differently.  The 
argument is that the words "prior to a public hearing" in the last sentence of this section 
demonstrate that the legislature could not have intended to allow disciplinary proceeding 
records to be released whenever written authorization to release them is furnished, but 
must have meant to preserve the confidentiality of such records pending a public hearing 
on the matter.  This argument is certainly plausible; it is, however, not supported by the 
syntax of this sentence.  The sentence provides that "[e]xcept upon such written 
authorization," disciplinary proceeding records shall remain confidential prior to a public 
hearing, which necessarily means that if such authorization is furnished, the records are 
not confidential.  If it were indisputable that the legislature did not intend this 
interpretation, and if this construction would produce an absurd result, we would eschew 
it, the language of the statute notwithstanding.  See, e.g., Knight v. International 
Harvester Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382 (Tex. 1982); McKinney v. Blankenship, 282 
S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1955) (court construing statute must look to legislative intent, give 
effect to that intent, and avoid unreasonable interpretations).  However, where, as here, 
the wording of the statute points so plainly to the conclusion that disciplinary proceeding 
records are to be released at any time upon submission of proper written authorization; 
where there is no legislative history indicating that the legislature could not have 
intended this result; and where this result is reasonable, we must adopt it.  See, e.g., Ex 
parte Roloff, 510 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1974) (plain statutory language must be given effect 
as written).  If the legislature desires to rewrite section 25 to provide for the 
confidentiality of these records, it may do so; the plain meaning of the statute as now 
written, however, compels the conclusion that disciplinary proceeding records must be 
released on submission of proper written authorization.

	Accordingly, assuming arguendo that the information at issue here is within 
section 3(a)(3) of article 6252-17a, it is within both that exception and section 25 of 
article 41a-1.  Section 3(a)(3) is a general exemption, whereas section 25 is a specific 
provision that applies to particular information in the board's possession.  Because 
specific statutes prevail over general ones, Cuellar v. State, 521 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1975); Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 198 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. 1947), 
section 25 supersedes section 3(a)(3).

	The board has grounded its claim of entitlement to withhold this information 
entirely on the exceptions to the Open Records Act.  For the reasons given, we conclude 
that those exceptions must yield to section 25 of article 41a-1, and that the requested 
records must be released.  We have no indication that any information contained in these 
records is excepted from disclosure by constitutional right of privacy or by any other 
right that might relate to a third party.  Should you wish to make such an assertion, you 
must do so within ten days.

Very truly yours,

Jim Mattox
Attorney General of Texas

Jack Hightower
First Assistant Attorney General

Mary Keller
Executive Assistant Attorney General

Rick Gilpin
Chairman, Opinion Committee

Prepared by Jon Bible
Assistant Attorney General