Open Records Decision No. 427 April 15, 1985 Re: Whether a police academy is an educational institution under section 3(a)(14) of the Open Records Act, article 6252-17a, V.T.C.S. Honorable Kathryn J. Whitmire Mayor City of Houston P. O. Box 1562 Houston, Texas 77251 Dear Ms. Whitmire: A newspaper reporter has asked the city of Houston for access to two letters apparently written by [a named Captain] on, about April 27 or 28 [1984], concerning the academy status of two [named] Police Department academy recruits. You argue that sections 3(a)(2) and 3(a)(14) of the Open Records Act, article 6252-17a, V.T.C.S., authorize the city to deny this request. Section 3(a)(14) generally excepts from required disclosure “student records at educational institutions funded wholly, or in part, by state revenue.” Section 14(e) of the act further provides that [n]othing in this Act shall be construed to require the release of information contained in education records of any educational agency or institution except in conformity with the provisions of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 [hereinafter 'the Buckley Amendment'], as enacted by Section 513 of Public Law 93- 380, codified as Title 20 U.S.C.A. Section 1232g, as amended. You claim that these sections embrace the two letters in question because [b]oth these letters were written concerning these officers' progress as students at the Police Academy for the city of Houston and are part of their student records as well as their personnel file. The Police Academy is an extension of Houston Community College and Sam Houston State University, both of which receive state funds. Once cadets complete their academy training, they have 18 hours of college credit with Houston Community College. We presume that both institutions are recipients of federal funds. We have examined the letters in question. Both contain information concerning the performance of the two police cadets in qualifying tests administered at the Police Academy. If the Police Academy is an “educational institution,” then these letters would constitute the kind of “education records” that may be released only in accordance with the provisions of the Buckley Amendment and the Open Records Act. See 20 U.S.C. §1232g(a)(4)(A) (1982) (definition of “education records”); subsection (a)(6) (definition of “student”); subsection (b)(1) (prohibiting release of “education records (or personally identifiable information . . .) of students without . . . written consent . . . other than to [certain named parties]”); see also, e.g., Open Records Decision No. 294 (1981) (indicating the kind of records held to be within student records exception of Open Records Act). The only question is whether these letters are education records of any “educational agency or institution” within the meaning of the Open Records Act. The Open Records Act does not define “educational institution,” section 3(a)(14), or “educational agency or institution,” section 14(e). Moreover, the Buckley Amendment sheds no light on the meaning of these terms; it merely states that an “educational agency or institution” is “any public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable program.” 20 U.S.C. §1232g(a)(1)(C)(3) (1982). Because these terms are not defined in the applicable statutes, they must be given their ordinary and popular meaning. See, e.g., Sanford v. State, 492 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). We have examined several cases in which the meaning of “education” and “educational institution” is at issue. Almost without exception these cases define “education” expansively. See, e.g., Girard School District v. Pittenger, 392 A.2d 261, 264 (Pa. 1978) (“education” is impartation or acquisition of knowledge, skill or discipline of character); Harbor Schools, Inc. v. Board of Appeals of Haverhill, 366 N.E.2d 764, 767 (Mass. App. 1977) (“education” a broad, comprehensive term involving process of developing and training mental, moral, or physical powers and faculties). They also establish that in deciding whether an institution is an “educational institution” courts will ask, among other things, whether education is the primary function of the institution. See, e.g., LaManna v. Electrical Workers Local Union No. 474 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, 518 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1974) (where union's educational services incidental, union not an “educational institution” entitled to property tax exemption); Melcancon v. State Board of Education, 195 So.2d 289 (La. 1967) (“educational institution,” within meaning of state constitution, is permanent, state-controlled establishment located on state property and sustained by state appropriations to provide education through staff of professionally trained educators); Birmingham Business College v. Whetstone, 82 So.2d 539 (Ala. 1955) (business college, which offered courses in business law, accounting and secretarial capacities, was “educational institution” within meaning of state constitution and laws). Based on this array of cases decided in a similar manner by courts throughout the country, we conclude that a Texas court faced with the question of whether the city of Houston Police Academy is an “educational institution” within the meaning of the Open Records Act would answer in the affirmative. The exclusive purpose of the academy is to provide the training and skills necessary to be an effective and competent police officer. The academy is an extension of both a community college and a state university. It receives state funds. Cadets who complete its training course receive 18 hours of college credit. In light of these facts, we conclude that the academy offers “education” and that it is an “educational institution” as these terms are ordinarily and popularly understood. For these reasons we conclude that the letters at issue in this instance constitute “education records of [an] educational agency or institution” within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Open Records Act and “student records at [an] educational [institution] funded wholly, or in part, by state revenue” within the meaning of section 3(a)(14) of the act. As such, they may be disclosed only in accordance with the provisions of the Buckley Amendment and the Open Records Act. Neither act permits the disclosure of these letters in this instance, unless the subjects of the letters consent to their release. 20 U.S.C. §1232g(b)(1) (1982). We understand that no such consent has been given. Because we have resolved your question on the basis of sections 3(a)(14) and 14(e) of the Open Records Act, we do not address your section 3(a)(2) claim. Very truly yours, Jim Mattox Attorney General of Texas Tom Green First Assistant Attorney General David R. Richards Executive Assistant Attorney General Rick Gilpin Chairman, Opinion Committee Prepared by Jon Bible Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE Rick Gilpin, Chairman Jon Bible Colin Carl Susan Garrison Tony Guillory Jim Moellinger Jennifer Riggs Nancy Sutton