Open Records Decision No. 393
July 26, 1983

	Re:  Whether police report regarding sexual abuse of a child is excepted under the 
Open Records Act

Gene Kloss
Captain
Crime Control Bureau
Ector County
P. O. Box 2066
Odessa, Texas  79760

Dear Captain Kloss:

	In 1980, an individual was charged with aggravated kidnapping and aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child.  This individual, who is now an inmate of the Texas Department 
of Corrections, has asked you for a copy of the Ector County sheriff's report of the 
investigation into these crimes.  You have asked whether the Open Records Act, article 
6252-17a, V.T.C.S., requires you to comply with this request.

	Section 3(a)(1) of the Open Records Act excepts from required public disclosure:

information deemed confidential by law, either Constitutional, 
statutory, or by judicial decision.

	In Open Records Decision No. 339 (1982), this office considered the availability 
of law enforcement records relating to a particular case of sexual abuse.  This decision 
contains the following discussion:

	In the present instance, we believe that much of this 
information may be withheld under section 3(a)(1), as 'information 
deemed confidential by law,' in this case, common law privacy.  A 
common law right of privacy will ordinarily exist in any 
information which contains highly intimate or embarrassing facts 
about a person, the disclosure of which would be 'highly 
objectionable to a person of ordinary sensibilities,' and, in addition, 
is of no legitimate concern to the public.  Industrial Foundation of 
the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board, 540 S.W.2d 668, 678-
81 (Tex. 1976) . . .  It is clear that a detailed description of an 
incident of aggravated sexual abuse raises an issue of common law 
privacy.  See Open Records Decision Nos. 260, 237 (1980) . . .

	In our opinion, common law privacy permits the withholding of 
the name of every victim of a serious sexual offense.  See Open 
Records Decision No. 205 (1978).  The mere fact that a person has 
been the object of a rape or attempted rape does, we believe, reveal 
'highly intimate or embarrassing facts' about the victim, and, in our 
view, disclosure of this fact would be 'highly objectionable to a 
person of ordinary sensibilities.'  Although there is certainly a strong 
public interest in knowing that a crime has been committed, we do 
not believe that such interest requires the disclosure of the names of 
victims.  Furthermore, certain other information, such as the 
location of the crime, might furnish a basis for identification of the 
victim.

	The report at issue here consists almost entirely of detailed statements of the 
officers who investigated these crimes, and statements of the complainant, witnesses, and 
others.  Each of these statements refers repeatedly to the victim of these crimes or to the 
victim's relatives, and each also contains abundant information which could easily 
furnish a basis for identification of the victim.  For the reasons discussed in Open 
Records Decision No. 339 (1982), we conclude that the information which either 
identifies or would tend to identify the victim may be withheld under the common law 
right of privacy.  We further conclude that this identifying information accounts for such 
a large part of the police report and is so inextricably intertwined with the remainder of 
this report that it would be unfeasible to attempt to separate the remainder and make it 
available.  The nonidentifying information would, if separated, be devoid of meaning.  
We therefore conclude that you may deny this request in its entirety.

Very truly yours,

Jim Mattox
Attorney General of Texas

Tom Green
First Assistant Attorney General

David R. Richards
Executive Assistant Attorney General

Prepared by Jon Bible
Assistant Attorney General

Approved:
Opinion Committee

Rick Gilpin, Acting Chairman
Jon Bible
Colin Carl
Jim Moellinger